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THE IMPORTANCE OF REVERENCE} 
Lawrence H. Davis 
Is it more important to love God, or to revere Him? On the account of 
reverence I give, it differs both from literal "fear" of God and from love-but 
the latter only if certain Humean views are incorrect. Assuming my account, 
it follows that reverence is virtually a prerequisite for love. Also, there are 
reasons to think God is more concerned with asking reverence from humanity 
than with asking for their love. In these respects, at least, reverence is more 
important. 
Which is more important in a person's spiritual life, to love God, or to revere 
Him? 
The question presupposes that there is a distinction-that reverence is not 
merely a species of love. This is occasionally denied, perhaps because it is 
thought that "reverence" entirely without love would be nothing but "fear," 
assumed to be an unworthy element in the spiritual life. I think this is incor-
rect. In section I, I will consider what reverence is, and some ways in which 
it is like and unlike fear and love. In section II, I will argue that reverence 
so understood is virtually a prerequisite for genuine love of God, and is less 
problematically viewed as something which God requires of us. For these 
two reasons, and a third I shall mention, reverence may be judged more 
important. 
I 
Etymologically, "reverence" is "fear." Biblical Hebrew, also, does not dis-
tinguish verbally between the two concepts. But it should be noted that fear 
itself has many varieties.2 There is for example what I will call "terror," a 
state in which a person in a sense loses control of himself or herself because 
of the item feared. The result may be paralysis, failure to take any action, or 
some sort of panicked reaction. In the latter case, the behavior may not be 
fully voluntary. Even if voluntary, it will characteristically not have been 
thought out, and may not coincide with what the agent would have chosen to 
do had he or she not fallen victim to this terror. Behavior stemming from 
terror is thus not rational from the agent's point of view, or is rational only 
by accident. The "accident" may be past training, or the agent's evolutionary 
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history, in which case it would not be pure luck if the terror-stricken individ-
ual behaves adequately. But the behavior is not what we would call the 
product of the agent's rational thought processes at the time. 
A very different type of fear is that expressed by remarks like "I fear that 
it will start raining before we reach home," or "I fear that the Cardinals will 
not win today." As 1 imagine the setting, the very fact that the agent uses 
words like these indicates that control has not been lost. To the contrary, 
these remarks could function as preludes or invitations to rational consider-
ation of what to do. "Shall we start walking faster? Prepare ourselves for 
disappointment?" 1 do not have a convenient name for this type of fear-I 
shall refer to it as "the second type of fear," or just "fear" where it is clear 
enough that 1 do not mean what 1 have called "terror." This second type of 
fear may be classified as a rational attitude. Given that one would like to 
stay dry, or experience the thrill of victory for one's side, fear that it will 
rain or that the Cardinals will lose may be a perfectly rational response to 
perception of dark clouds or superior pitching by the opposing team. 
1 forego discussion of other types of fear, and other aspects of the two we 
have distinguished. Our concern is with reverence. My claim is that rever-
ence, like the second type of fear, is a rational attitude. 
1 shall not argue directly for this claim, but simply present an account of 
reverence in accordance with it. The account implies that reverence is quite 
different from love. After exploring this, I will explain one reason some may 
have had for rejecting or never considering an account like mine, preferring 
one instead according to which reverence may just be a certain kind of love. 
Understanding reverence as a rational attitude means understanding it as 
not just a feeling-of awe, for example. To fear that it will rain is not to feel 
a certain way "inside,"3 but to recognize a certain kind of relation between 
one's situation and one's preferences.4 One would like to stay dry, but it is 
likely to prove difficult, unless appropriate steps are taken. Similarly with 
reverence for God. One would like to do various things, or nothing in partic-
ular; but here is a superior being with a different agenda. Again, it may be 
appropriate to alter one's plans. The paradigm case for this understanding of 
reverence is the story of Abraham's near-sacrifice of Isaac upon God's re-
quest (Genesis 22). Afterward, the angel says to him (verse 12) "Now I know 
that you are God-fearing"-Le., reverent.s The point was not how Abraham 
felt-nor, for that matter, whether he trembled-but how he was ready to act 
in response to his perception of the divine, his attitude toward God. 
Reverence and the second type of fear are structurally alike but importantly 
different. Each is "rational" in that it motivates, or is, a readiness to behave 
in ways that are rational from the agent's point of view. Fear that it will rain 
may lead to hastening one's progress toward shelter. The behavior is rational 
partly because of the agent's beliefs that it might rain, and that if it does, he 
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or she stands a chance of getting wet. We can say these are beliefs about the 
object of the fear. Reverence for God led Abraham to place his son upon the 
altar. Again, rationality ofthe behavior has to do with beliefs about the object 
of the attitude-for example, that He had indeed asked this of Abraham. But 
in the first case, we naturally suppose that the agent already had an aversion 
to getting wet. A supposition like this is essential to our understanding the 
fear-motivated behavior as rational from the agent's point of view. In the 
second case, we need make no such supposition about antecedent motivation. 
To the contrary, we should suppose Abraham's beliefs about God themselves 
supplied the motivation, independently of his desires and aversions. For ex-
ample, he may have believed God to be supremely great and exalted, from 
which it followed that his love for his son was trivial alongside God's wish 
for a sacrifice. (See Genesis 18:27.) Schematically, we have: 
Diagram 1 
Antecedent aversion 
Beliefs about object of fear 
Fear; fear-motivated behavior 
Diagram 2 
Beliefs about object of reverence 
Reverence; reverential behavior 
In these diagrams, what is above the line explains the rationality of what is 
below the line. The fear and associated behavior is rational from the agent's 
point of view because of the aversion and the beliefs. But the rationality of 
the reverence and behavior manifesting it is explained simply by reference 
to the beliefs. In the preceding paragraph, it was suggested that fear and 
reverence can each be identified with a "recognition" of a certain sort (see 
note 4). We might say then that each is in itself a ~cognitive" state. The 
difference between them brought out in this paragraph is that fear, unlike 
reverence, presupposes and depends on a previously existing "conative" state. 
We should say more about the rationality of Abraham's behavior from his 
own point of view. Earlier I hinted that reverence for an entity involved 
perception of that entity as "superior," and I have just suggested that Abraham 
believed God to be "supremely great and exalted." I have in mind something 
like the following. An agent A reveres an entity E only if A thinks that E is 
objectively more important than A himself. Where E is itself an agent, this 
means that E's intentions, plans, and purposes take precedence over A's. 
And where E can communicate with A, E's expressed wishes take precedence 
over A's personal concerns, other things equal.6 A regards this as an objective 
matter of fact. So for A not to obey E (when other things are equal) would 
be from A's point of view a failure to respond appropriately to the facts; it 
would be irrational. 
On my account, then, an agent who has genuine reverence for something 
implicitly sides with Kant against Hume on the matter of 'is' and 'ought.' 
Such an agent believes that there are situations in which reason by itself 
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dictates what should be done. My account is itself incompatible with Hume's 
position on reason as a motivator of action. By it, if A reveres E, then A will 
be minded to obey E simply because afwhat is believed about E. A may have 
no desire at all to obey E or to promote E's objectives. In Kantian terms, we 
might say that Abraham went to sacrifice Isaac out of a sense of duty, and 
against the pressure of all his inclinations to spare his son. 
Notice that the account given of fear as a rational attitude does not involve 
this double-conflict with Hume. For as Diagram 1 shows, the agent's moti-
vation comes ultimately from an aversion, not from "pure reason." Nor would 
the agent of our example believe he or she had reason to hasten home, but 
for the aversion to getting wet. (Real-life agents, including undergraduates, 
tend to believe that this aversion itself is inherently rational. But this is a 
different issue.) But in the case of reverence, the conflict cannot be avoided. 
The agent is in fact motivated by perception of certain features in the object 
of reverence, which are taken to provide sufficient reason to make reverential 
behavior rational. 
A complete account of reverence would have to attend to other features of 
the concept. I have already mentioned (though only to ignore) the view that 
there are characteristic inner feelings associated with reverence. There may 
after all be a conceptual tie with "terror." And some find a similarity in the 
kind of readiness for action motivated by both fear and reverence.' These last 
two points may help explain why reverence is referred to with a term that 
also means "fear." Finally, I suspect that there are social aspects. Reverence 
as a psychological phenomenon may presuppose the existence in one's cul-
ture of conventionally defined acts of reverence.8 
But for present purposes we need concentrate only on the fact that rever-
ence is a rational attitude. For it is in this respect that it contrasts with love. 
Love may be called an "attitude," as plausibly as may reverence and fear; 
is it not also rational? Isn't the behavior of a person in love also "rational 
from the agent's point of view"? Only if love itself is included in "the agent's 
point of view." Thus, suppose A buys B some flowers because he loves her. 
We may say his action is "rational from his point of view" if we think that 
because of his love he "views" B as someone for whom it is appropriate to 
buy flowers. But this trivializes the idea of a "rational" attitude. Suppose A 
has an irrational terror of B, because of which he flees from her presence. 
This behavior is also "rational from his point of view" if that point of view 
includes the terror. For having that attitude, he views B as someone from 
whom to flee. Perhaps terror should not be counted as an "attitude." Suppose 
then that A is embarrassed at having forgotten B's birthday, and is for this 
reason motivated to leave town. Such behavior might or might not be rational 
in the light of his antecedent values and beliefs (including the belief that he 
forgot B's birthday). But it will automatically be "rational from his point of 
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view" if that point of view includes the embarrassment, given how deep it is . 
. For part of what it is to be embarrassed is to want to hide oneself, or some 
such. (In all three of these examples, I ignore the possibility that other factors 
might make it more rational from the agent' s point of view not to buy flowers, 
flee, or leave town.) 
Fear of the second type is not like this. If A is running to his house because 
he fears that it will rain, his behavior is "rational from his point of view" 
even if the fear itself is not included in that point of view. True, if asked why 
he is running, he might say "Because I fear it will rain," just as he might say 
"Because I love her" if asked why he bought flowers for B. But in the case 
of fear, reference to the attitude is eliminable: "Because I think it might rain, 
and I'm averse to getting wet." Note that in Diagram 1, reproduced below, 
the fear and the behavior are below the line. This means that either can be 
explained as rational in terms of the items above the line. It is not necessary 
to explain the behavior in terms of the fear, even if we think of the fear as a 
state mediating between the items above the line and the behavior. 
Diagram 1 
Antecedent aversion 
Beliefs about object of fear 
Fear; fear-motivated behavior 
But in the case of love, reference to the attitude is not eliminable. It will not 
suffice to say, for example, "Because she likes flowers." Perhaps it is true 
(as Nagel and Kant have urged) that it is rational to fulfill anyone's desire 
that one can, other things equal. But this time, the flowers were bought out 
of love for the individual, not general benevolence. The agent must say 
something like "Because I love her, and she likes flowers." Otherwise, his 
explanation is incomplete and possibly misleading. This situation is repre-
sented by Diagram 3. Here, the love is above the line. This means that 
explanation of the behavior 
Diagram 3 
Love 
Beliefs about object of love 
Love-motivated behavior 
as rational from the agent's point of view must include mention of the agent's 
love for the beneficiary of his behavior. 
Reverence is like fear and unlike love in this regard. Abraham could explain 
his conduct by saying "Because I revere God, and He asked me to sacrifice 
Isaac." But the reference to reverence is eliminable. He could just as well 
have said "Because God is supremely great and exalted, and ...... This would 
be an incorrect explanation only if God is not in fact supremely great or 
exalted in the intended sense. But even then, the explanation would not be 
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misleading. Abraham would be making it quite clear that he acted as he did 
because of certain features he believed were present in God, and which in his 
view sufficed to make the sacrifice of Isaac mandatory.9 Diagram 2, repro-
duced below, shows this, again by placing both the attitude and the behavior 
motivated by it below the line. 
Diagram 2 
Beliefs about object of reverence 
Reverence; reverential behavior 
Perhaps it will be claimed that reference to love is equally eliminable after 
all: "I bought her flowers because 1 perceived in her certain love-evoking 
features, and ...... But is the agent implying his love was a rational response 
to perception of these alleged "love-evoking features," or is he implying that 
they merely caused him to love her, not by a rational process? If the latter, 
then love is already not a rational attitude. And reference to love could be 
eliminated from the explanation of the flower-buying only if the "love-evoking 
features" unfailingly produce love. Otherwise, the full explanation would have 
to be: "I bought her flowers because I perceived in her certain love-evoking 
features which did, indeed, cause me to love her; and she likes flowers." 
If the "love-evoking features" led to the love by a rational process, we ask 
whether the result is taken to be rationally required, as reverence is taken to 
be a rationally required response to God's "superiority" or "exaltedness." I 
would be suspicious of an affirmative answer, whatever these love-evoking 
features may be. And if not, then once again, reference to the love is not 
eliminable from the explanation of the behavior. For despite perception of 
the features, and even if the agent is fully rational, the love might not have 
ensued, in which case the behavior would not have occurred. 
If per impossibiie, as I think, suitable "love-evoking features" exist to be 
cited in explanations of this sort, I might have to concede the point about 
eliminability. Love would still be unlike fear (of the second type) and rever-
ence in a second respect noted. For love is itself a "conative" state while 
reverence and even fear (of the second type) are in themselves "cognitive" 
states. To love someone or something is in large part if not entirely to have 
a number of desires concerning that object. Desire plays no role in reverence, 
however, and is at best an antecedent, not an ingredient, of fear. 
My account of reverence and its distinction from love requires the Kantian 
position that an attitude can be purely "cognitive," that beliefs can motivate 
action without the help of any desire or other "conative" factor. If Kant is 
wrong about this and Hume is right, reverence as I have described it cannot 
exist. What account will followers of Hume give, then, if they also believe 
that there is such a thing as reverence? 
On my account, Abraham's belief that God is supremely great and exalted 
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directly motivated him to accept God's commands and act on them. The 
simplest way to harmonize this with Humean psychology would be to inter-
pose a desire between belief and readiness to act. A Humean would say that 
Abraham acted as he did not from anything like a Kantian sense of duty, but 
from a desire to obey God, to fulfill God's wishes. This desire may have been 
aroused by Abraham's belief in God's greatness and exaltedness. And a 
Humean could even grant Abraham the belief that it is rational for him and 
everyone to have this desire because of this belief. (This is not to say the 
Humean would agree with this belief.) But the belief caused the behavior 
only via this desire. Had the belief failed to cause the desire, Abraham would 
not have tried to sacrifice his son. 
This maneuver virtually collapses the distinction between reverence and 
love. For an intrinsic desire to obey God, especially if as strong as it would 
have to have been in the case of Abraham, can fairly be called a form of love 
for God. At best, reverence could be distinguished as love for God having a 
certain kind of origin-viz., arousal by belief in God's greatness. (Alterna-
tively, reverence might be a non-intrinsic desire to obey God, derivative from 
a general desire to do what is right, coupled with a belief that obedience to 
God is right. This belief in tum might stem from belief in God's greatness, 
or it might have some other etiology. But if the desire to obey God is deriv-
ative from anything like a desire to avoid divine punishment, it would be 
neither love nor reverence, but fear.) But it is unclear why the distinction 
between love and reverence would be made, if this were the way to make it. 
For example, there would be no point to recommending both love and rever-
ence for God. And our opening question, which is more important, would be 
obviously wrong-headed. The question could only be whether it was prefer-
able that one's love for God have a certain causal background or not. 
I submit then that witting and unwitting followers of Hume are blind to an 
understanding of reverence of the sort I have developed, and so are prone to 
identify "true" love and "true" reverence for the divine. No doubt there are 
other reasons why people have made this identification. But I think the pop-
ularity of Humean psychology has played a role, and this is in any case the 
most philosophically interesting reason. Once one is no longer enslaved to 
Humean views of reason and the passions, however, reverence may plausibly 
be understood as a rational attitude, a purely "cognitive" state, entirely dis-
tinct from love. 
II 
Assuming my account of what reverence is and how it differs from love, 
we return to our opening question: which is more important? I promised to 
offer three considerations in favor of reverence. By 'more important' here, I 
do not mean anything like "more precious to God" or "more valuable to the 
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person." Rather, I wish to point out ways in which reverence seems to be 
more fundamental or essential to a proper, healthy relationship with God. 
Ultimately, I would like to argue that love for God need not figure in such a 
relationship at all; but I shall not go quite so far in this paper. 
1. A person who reveres God believes that God has certain features because 
of which it is rational to, for example, obey Him, other things equal. If this 
belief is false (as Hume would maintain), then reverence cannot be important 
at all to the spiritual life. At least, I would find very puzzling a claim that 
spiritual growth requires cultivating an attitude which incorporates a false 
belief. So let us continue the discussion on the assumption that this belief is 
true. And for convenience, let us assume also that the relevant divine feature 
is "exaltedness." 
Reverence is a rational response to awareness of God's exaltedness. (Com-
pare: fear that it will rain is a rational response to awareness of the likelihood 
of rain, in a person averse to getting wet, who stands to get wet if it does 
rain.) Now whatever precisely "exaltedness" consists in, it would seem to be 
a central attribute, or an implication of central attributes, of God. For starters, 
He is the creator and sustainer of the entire universe and His will reigns 
supreme within it. This would seem to imply a measure of divine exaltedness 
relative to us. It would be hard, then, to have a clear idea of who God is, yet 
somehow fail to be aware of His exaltedness. If one has this awareness and 
is in addition sufficiently rational, one will perforce revere God. (Again, I 
am ignoring possible other aspects of reverence, such as the involvement of 
social conventions.) 
Now consider a person who loves God. He or she must have some concep-
tion of the object of this love. If this conception diverges too far from the 
truth, we should say it is not God who is loved, but some other being, who 
mayor may not exist. (Others can consider the question under what circum-
stances this person might be an unwitting idolator.) If it is God whom the 
person loves, the conception may still be (must be?) incomplete. Still, it is 
plausible to suppose that a satisfactory conception will include God's exalted-
ness, or those of His central attributes which imply His exaltedness. 
It follows that any sufficiently rational person who truly loves God must 
also revere Him. And if we assume that rationality and an adequate concep-
tion of God are prerequisites for a spiritually satisfactory love of God, then 
reverence also is in effect a prerequisite for this love. To love God is already 
to revere Him. 
In our society and others there may be many pious individuals who osten-
sibly love God yet do not seem to revere Him as I have described reverence. 
For example, they do not seem motivated to serve God because of His ex-
altedness. This may be because their love for God and their consequent desire 
to serve Him are so great as to mask the presence of the purely rational 
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motivation. A relevant counterfactual might still be true: "If you were to cease 
loving God, ...... Less happily, the person's understanding of God-in partic-
ular, His exaltedness-might be deficient. Perhaps the person has never 
thought much about the kind of being God is, or has focussed on less central 
attributes. More likely, the defect is in the person's rationality; the mental 
machinery just does not make the automatic transition from perception (un-
derstanding) of the divine exaltedness to realization of the propriety of self-
subordination to the divine. Of course a follower of Hume would deny that 
this is a defect in rationality and might deny that it is any kind of defect at 
all. The influence of views like Hume's may partly explain why reverence is 
not more in evidence in our society. (One thinks here of Alasdair MacIntyre's 
claim that there has been a general breakdown of our moral concepts in the 
last 300 years.)IO But we have already assumed for purposes of discussion 
that Hume is wrong. If a person has an adequate conception of God but does 
not revere Him, there is a defect in the person's rationality. 
There is a way to escape this argument. I said above that it would be hard 
to have a clear idea of who God is, yet be unaware of His exaltedness. But 
"exaltedness" may have to be understood as relative to oneself. Its role in 
reverence is to ground such judgments as the one ascribed above to Abraham, 
that his love and hopes for Isaac are insignificant next to God's request for 
a sacrifice. If "exaltedness" is so relativized, then one can know God, be 
rational, yet fail to revere Him if one is relevantly unaware of who one is, 
oneself. And there is a spiritual ideal which calls precisely for such unaware-
ness of self, for losing oneself in the divine. Advocates of this ideal could 
say that reverence is wholly unimportant. At best, it would be psychologically 
necessary at the beginning of one's spiritual life; but the goal would be to 
rid oneself of the awareness necessary for its existence. So long as one 
continued to revere God, an attitude distinct from one's presumably growing 
love for God, one would still not have reached the ultimate spiritual goal. 
Whereas on other views of the goal, reverence would be a necessary and 
permanent part of one's relation to God, from its inception throughout one's 
spiritual life. (It should not be thought, however, that reverence is a static 
phenomenon. One can grow in reverence just as one can grow in love.) I do 
not think the converse is true. I have already expressed doubt that there are 
any "love-evoking features" to the perception of which love would be a 
rationally required response. If I am right, then it is possible to be fully 
rational, have an adequate conception of God, and so revere Him, but still 
not love Him. One could not then argue in the same way that love would be 
a necessary and permanent part of one's relation to God. In this sense, rev-
erence would be more "important" than love. 
2. Suppose a reason for the "importance" of loving God is alleged to be 
that God has commanded us to love Him. (How could there be a satisfactory 
144 Faith and Philosophy 
spiritual relationship with God that did not include positive response to His 
commands regarding that relationship?) A parallel reason could be given for 
the "importance" of revering Him.H But these two alleged reasons are not 
equally plausible. 
There is an old question how love can be commanded. Some have held that 
since one cannot love "at will," it would have been improper for God to 
command it; and being morally perfect, He must not have done so. At most, 
He has commanded loving behavior: acts of worship, zealousness in promot-
ing His goals, and so on. The corresponding question how reverence could 
be commanded was rarely if ever raised, to my knowledge. But for all that 
it is rational, reverence is still an attitude, and not one that one can adopt "at 
will." It is an attitude one comes to have in response to God's exaltedness. 
One reason why the question was not asked about reverence may be that 
reverence was not distinguished from fear. A command to be in "terror" of God 
would be as problematic as a command to love Him. But the second type of fear 
can be commanded, if it can be supposed that the addressees of the command 
all have appropriate antecedent motivation. For example, a command to "fear 
God" addressed to a person averse to pain might be interpreted as an admonition 
to reflect on the certainty of divine retribution. (Cf. Diagram 1.) 
The truth is, however, that even love and other "emotions" can be com-
manded. If it is impossible to acquire them "at will," one can take steps to 
acquire them over a period of time. 
There is still a reason for thinking the alleged command to love to be more 
suspect than the alleged command to revere. This emerges from a significant 
difference in the steps one would have to take in order to comply with them. 
The preceding discussion indicates a straightforward course of action for one 
who does not revere God but considers himself commanded to do so. He 
must enhance his rationality and/or reflect more deeply on God's exaltedness. 
But what shall a person do, to get himself to love God? If there is no more-
or-less clear way to undertake compliance, one may wonder if God can really 
have issued such a command. 
Perhaps a procedure like that advocated by Pascal for generating belief in 
God would work to generate love for Him. Perhaps a pill could be developed, 
or some appropriate psychotherapy devised. I cannot deny these possibilities 
a priori. Nor will I consider how suitable any of them may be as a way for 
a non-lover of God to bring himself into compliance with the alleged com-
mand to love. 
What I do wish to examine is the suggestion that the way to do it involves 
enhancing and exploiting one's rationality. I am committed to denying this 
suggestion, by my twice-expressed disbelief that there are any "love-evok-
ing" features to which love is a rationally required response. For if there are 
none at all, then there are none to be found in the divine nature or in His 
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interactions with us. And where else would one look, to get oneself by a 
rational process to love God? 
I have not defended my disbelief. And I do not deny that in fact, love for 
God often does result from reflection on His nature. But I deny that there is 
any rational necessity in this result. 
Perhaps love for God would result from reflection on all the good things 
God has done for one (and disregard of all the bad)?12 More likely, such 
reflection would culminate in gratitude to God. But gratitude-however im-
portant it may be in one's spiritual life-is not love. 
Most promising is the suggestion that one reflect on the fact, if it is a fact, 
that God loves us. There is still no guarantee; there is such a thing as unre-
quited love. But people speak of love for God as a "free" response to His 
love for us. This suggests that awareness of God's love may put it within 
one's power to reciprocate, voluntarily. If so, there is no difficulty in sup-
posing God to have commanded us to love Him-provided there is no diffi-
CUlty in supposing us to be aware of God's love for us. 
I confess however to having some difficulty in understanding this love. 
The logical positivist in me keeps wanting to ask if it comes to anything more 
than the fact that God sustains us in existence for whatever period of time 
and through whatever hardships He in fact does SO.13 If it is to evoke recip-
rocal love, it seems it would have to mean something more. I suspect that 
whatever it means, it is what Aquinas would call a truth of faith, or revelation, 
as opposed to a truth of reason. That is, only people who have been told that 
God loves them, and have accepted the message, can reasonably be expected 
(commanded) to love Him back. 
As is well known, this is a proper subset of all people, even all people who 
are as fully rational as people come. I believe H is a smaller set than, even 
if not a subset of, the people who are rational enough and aware enough of 
the divine to be subject to the alleged command to revere God. The idea that 
God loves everyone, or anyone prior to their love and devotion to Him, is 
not so widespread as the idea that He is exalted. If it is true, then, that God 
commands both love and reverence, it is also true that He has addressed the 
former command, or meaningfully addressed it, to a much smaller segment 
of humanity than the latter. One wants to say that in some sense, God cares 
equally for the spiritual welfare of every human being. But this invites the 
conclusion that in God's own judgment, love for God is not as essential a 
component of the spiritual life as is reverence. In this sense, once again, 
reverence is more "important" than love. 
3. A third line of argument might run as follows. Ideal service to God would 
be service with one's whole being-with all one's capacities. Still, the most 
important component of that service would be service drawing entirely on 
our highest capacity, that which makes us superior to "lower" creatures. This 
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is our rationality. But then reverence, not love, would be the more important 
component of our relationship with God. (Service of the mind would be more 
important than service of the heart.) 
There are many problems with this argument, and I do not endorse it. I 
mention it for two reasons. First, to forestall a possible similar argument 
employing the premise that our "highest" capacity is our capacity to love. 
Anyone tempted to use such a premise without argument should be reminded 
that there is a tradition which locates our "superiority," or our chief distinc-
tion among God's creatures, in our intellectual abilities, not in our emotional 
lives. 
Second, if we ignore the issue of "higher" and "lower," the argument can 
draw our attention to the fact that reverence is away, perhaps the way, to 
serve God as a rational being. Depending on how we feel about our status as 
rational beings, this may after all provide a reason for wanting our relation-
ship with God to include reverence, whether or not it also includes love. 
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NOTES 
1. My thanks to Robert Oakes, an anonymous referee for this journal, and the Editor of 
this journal, for helpful comments on an earlier version. 
2. In what 1 say about types of fear, 1 am indebted to Robert M. Gordon, "Fear," 
Philosophical Review 89 (1980), pp. 560-78. But 1 am not trying to present a rigorous or 
complete analysis, and my terminology does not coincide with his. See also Wayne Davis, 
"The Varieties of Fear," Philosophical Studies 51 (1987), pp. 287-310. 
3. For this reason, perhaps, some readers may not regard fear that it will rain as a 
"genuine" fear at all. But if not, it is that much harder to explain why it is acceptable to 
say things like "I fear it will rain," and that much harder to explain why reverence and 
fear have been associated as closely as they have been. 
4. I here identify the fear with a certain "recognition." In the last sentence of this 
paragraph and the second sentence of the next, I invite identification of the fear with a 
certain "readiness to behave." 1 do not know whether to claim the two are identical, or 
that the former causes the latter, or that their relation is more complicated. Nor do I know 
in how many ways the term 'recognition' may prove to be misleading. But I do wish to 
insist that fear is more than belief that a state of affairs is (somewhat) likely, in a person 
who would rather it was not. That is, 1 disagree with Wayne Davis's claim (p. 290 of his 
article): 
S is afraid that p iff S desires that not-p and is uncertain whether p, where 
the uncertainty is not based solely on indecision about a course of action. 
There must also have been some interaction between the belief and the preference, with 
a resulting impact upon the person's mental state. Minimally, this impact would be what 
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I here call a "recognition." I do not know how much more might properly be judged 
necessary; although it is of course not necessary that overt, fear-motivated behavior 
actually ensue. 
S. I remarked above that Biblical Hebrew does not have different words for "fear" and 
"reverence." Some may suspect that the whole concept of "reverence" as an attitude 
distinct from "fear" may not have existed in Biblical times, but may instead have devel-
oped as discomfort grew with the older idea that one ought literally to fear God. But the 
context here and elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible where the phrase "fear of God" is used 
makes it unlikely that "terror" alone is meant. (Abraham is described as taking three days 
to reach the appointed site, a bit long to be out of rational self-control!) Nor is it plausible 
to suppose fear of the second type is meant. As Abraham and his concerns are portrayed, 
it is unlikely that he could conceive of anything God might do to him worse than the very 
thing he was being asked to do to himself: kill his beloved son. The Biblical phrase "fear 
of God" probably covered also what in our day we might identify as "respect for basic 
morality"; see Genesis 20:11 and the discussion of "fear of God" in Moshe Weinfeld, 
Deuteronomy and The Deuteronomic School (Oxford, 1972). But its use in this Abraham 
story makes it clear that it does cover what we would consider a specifically religious 
attitude, reverence. See also Exodus 20: 17: "Fear not; for God has come only to test you, 
and in order that the fear of Him may be ever with you, so that you do not go astray." It 
seems to me that "fear of Him" here means "reverence for Him. " 
6. When would "other things" not be "equal"? One possibility would be a case where 
E's expressed wish is for something immoral; more accurately, something which A thinks 
is immoral. A might be ready to let E's wishes override A's purely personol concerns, yet 
not be ready to obey instructions to do something immoral. Such a scruple would in no 
way compromise A's reverence for E. There is no reason to think "reverence" entails total, 
exceptionless obedience. In the celebrated case of Abraham, there is no reason to think 
Abraham as portrayed thought God's request immoral or even exceptionally odd. It may 
be noted that in classical Jewish discussions, the puzzling feature of God's command to 
Abraham was not its alleged immorality, but its apparent conflict with God's earlier 
promise to Abraham that "through Isaac would he be considered to have seed" (Genesis 
21:12, my translation; see also 17:19,21). Contrast James Rachels, "God and Human 
Attitudes," Religious Studies 17 (1971) (reprinted in Steven M. Cahn and David Shatz, 
eds., Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 
pp. 167-81). 
7. Joseph Albo, a fifteenth century Jewish philosopher, wrote: 
Fear [i.e., fear or reverence] in general is a retreat of the psyche and an 
ingathering of its powers when one perceives something fear-inspiring. And 
this can be of two sorts. [First,] when it [sc. the psyche] perceives something 
potentially harmful.... [And second,] when it perceives something very 
great, exalted, ... and reflects on its own comparative worthlessness ... even if 
it does not anticipate any harm from that thing. 
(Sefer Halkkarim (Book of First Principles) lli:32; my translation.) I take his talk of 
the psyche's "retreat" and "ingathering of its powers" to be a metaphor for the perceived 
need in typical cases to stop what one is doing and reconsider one's plans upon sudden 
confrontation with a feared or revered object. 
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8. Rachels, in the article cited, makes a plausible case for the presence of such social 
aspects in the case of worship. 
9. On the strength of Isaiah 41:8, many say that Abraham also loved God, and acted 
as he did out of this love. But this just means that his conduct was overdetermined. He 
was ready to sacrifice Isaac from reverence, and he was also ready to do it from love. Our 
discussion concerns the determining factor featured in the Genesis account. 
10. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, 1981), p. 2. 
11. If indeed there is a divine command to revere God, it would imply that God Himself 
does not advocate losing oneself in Him as a spiritual ideal. For in order to revere God, 
one would have to retain one's awareness of oneself. This includes awareness of having 
interests and concerns of one's own, independently of God's, else there is nothing to 
subordinate to His will! 
12. Moses Maimonides apparently thinks love of God is the psychologically inevitable 
result of reflection on everything that God has done: 
When a person contemplates His deeds and great, wonderful creations, and 
in this way gains some insight into His wisdom which has neither measure 
nor limit, immediately he will love, praise, glorify, and experience a great 
yearning to know [Him] ... 
(Mishneh Torah, "Basic Principles of Torah," 2:2; my translation. Some interpreters 
say that 'His deeds' here refers specifically to God's revelations; but 'wonderful creations' 
surely includes everything else that God has done.) Would that Maimonides were right 
about this! 
He thinks that essentially the same reflection leads also to reverence, as is evident from 
the continuation of this passage: 
... And when he considers these same things further, immediately he will 
recoil, tremble, and realize that he is a small, lowly, and benighted creature 
standing with shallow and slight intelligence before the One who is perfect 
in knowledge. 
This time, his psychological claim fits with what we have said, if we read him as 
assuming everyone who "considers these same things further" is sufficiently rational. 
Perhaps in the 12th century this was a plausible assumption. 
Notice that Maimonides' description of a person coming to love God includes mention 
of a "yeaming." By contrast, no such "conative" factor appears in his description of 
nascent reverence. This also fits with the account we have given. 
13. Consider the following reminiscence of a "thalidomide baby," now grown up: "In 
kindergarten, I asked for the first time, 'Why don't I have legs?' 'Because God looked for 
someone to love extra special. He chose you to be that person ... ,''' one nun explained. 
Eileen Cronin-Noe, in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for July 30, 1987. 
